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'

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**"GOVERNANCE, PLURALISM &
TRANS-NATIONALISATION IN EUROPE"**

GovUNet
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ABBREVIATIONS

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
CEMAC+STP	Central African Economic and Monetary Union plus SàoTomé e Principe
COT	Countries and Overseas Territories
CPA	Cotonou Partnership Agreement
CSP	Common Strategy Paper
CARIFORUM	Caribbean EPA
ESA	East and Southern Africa
EASFCOM	Eastern Africa Stand-by- Force Coordination Mechanism
EPA	Economical Partnership Agreement
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States (plus Mauritania)
EC	European Community
CEN- SAD	Economic Community of Sahelo- Sharian States
EBF	Euro-African Business Forum
EDF	European Development Fund
EEC	European Economic Community
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
FASP	Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
JAES	Joint Africa- EU Strategy
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD)
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MIC	Middle Income Country
TDCA	Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NARC	North Africa Regional Capability
OUN	Organisation of United Nations
PACIFIC EPA	Pacific
RECs	Region Economic Communities
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community Group
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa

The European governance and the African Union (AE):
Influences and interaction in the democratization procedure.

Abstract

In this paper I will focus on the influence and the interaction of the EU governance model in the African Union, as a process and as a result. It is interesting to examine how they filter their own understanding of governance and if the European aquis is implemented in another regional organisation, such as the African Union.

As a procedure, the EU, as an exceptional unifying structure in the chronicles of international organizations, with specific legal and political characteristics, can cooperate with another regional organization, like the African Union. It is really interesting to see how the EU can influence the African Union through its institutional framework and how it transfers its own perspectives for "good" governance and, as a result, what the transaction between the two parts, EU and AU, is.

This paper consists of two sections:

-The first section (1st Section) discusses the African Union as a regional organization: its structure, institutions and legitimacy, searching the ways the EU has affected this organization.

- The second section (2nd Section) assesses the relations between EU and AU and how European governance is implemented in the AU. These two entities, do they have the same perception for the conditionality of democratic governance?

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INTRODUCTION

The **relationship between Africa and Europe is not new but dates back to the dawn of time.** Africa and Europe have journeyed together since centuries with good and bad moments. It has been marked by events of diverse and varied nature, whose remembrance may sometimes arouse deep emotions. It is an alliance out of 'necessity and of love'.

Africa's strategic and geopolitical importance for Europe as a neighboring continent is very well known. After many centuries European occupation, exploitation and colonialism of Africa have ended, but the consequences from the past left a lot of problems behind. At the same time the development impact and modernisation of the European presence in Africa was quite profound, leaving the basis for the development of the African continent and future cooperation with other entities[1]. But Africa still lives with her contradictions and the development process in each African country is not so simple.

At Community level, over the last few decades the European Commission has built up an extensive experience and concluded a number of contractual arrangements with different parts of Africa that provide partners with a solid foundation of predictability and security.

After the decolonization, **although the then European Economic Community (EEC) was not as an entity part of the colonial system**, some of its member were, and therefore it was motivated by a complicated mix of responsibility, altruism, commitment and of course self-interest, opening a new period of collaboration with Africa. On the other hand, Africa was looking to find a unique identity through the Pan-African movement.

For that reason it was necessary to transform the handicap of the past into real factors for development. **Africa must see Europe not as a past-colonial enemy any longer, nor as a donor, but as an equal partner based on true and honest relations between the two parts and Europe must support this point of view**.

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[1]Gerrit Oliver, (2011), 'From Colonialism to Partnership in Africa- Europe Relations?' The International Spectator, Vol 46, No.1, March 2011-53-67, ISSN 0393-2729 print/ ISSN 1751-9721 online

Europe and Africa **are connected by strong trade links,** making the EU the biggest export market for African products. For example, approximately **85% of Africa's exports of cotton, fruit and vegetables are imported by the EU**. Europe and Africa are also bound by substantial and predictable aid flows.

We have two regional systems: on the one hand, **the European Union (EU)**, an exceptional unifying structure in the chronicles of international organisations; and on the other, **the African Union (AU)** with 54 countries, which forms an inter-regional network of countries in Africa.

Regardless of the procedure, the cooperation frameworks between Europe and African states followed is creating a strengthened cooperative bond and a new, dynamic and equal relation and has been recognised and used many times as the counterpart to the tensions provoked by the Seattle Conference in the North-South relations and a model of future North/South relations.[2]

Many Agreements and Conventions fostered the cooperation between the two continents based on the advent of the rule of law, the respect for human rights, freedom of expression, respect for minorities, etc, so that the African countries become a fertile ground **of "good" governance.**

The dynamics of the relations between Africa and the EU are changing through the decades as the world becomes increasingly globalised and due to a number of changes affecting both sides. On the EU side there was a shift on the deepening of the European Integration, the development of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and on the African side, New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was launched in 2001, the OAU transformed into the AU in 2002 and pan-African cooperation became more evident.

As the EU has **become an international actor** in the external relations and mostly after the **Lisbon Treaty**, with a comprehensive treaty network and diplomatic infrastructures, the relations with Africa were profound and interacted in all the levels: regional, sub-regional and bilateral. The fact that the globalisation created new global players, provide Africa with

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[2]ΓρηγορίουΠ. (2009). Η Πολιτική και Θεσμική Διάσταση των Διμερών Σχέσεων ΕΕ και Αφρικανικών Χωρών. Αφρική και Ανάπτυξη. Η Τελευταία Παγκόσμια Ευκαιρία, Τσάλτας, Γρ.,εκδ. Ι.Σιδέρης, σελ. 104

significantly more choice in its selection of partners. **New South-South cooperation** [3] and particularly the Chinese interest for Africa, change the relations between Africa and EU, as Africa has many choices and is no longer a 'captive ally'. This issue was very important for the evolution of the relations between EU and Africa.

1st SESSION: AFRICA: WHAT IS THE VISION AFTER DECOLONISATION?

Pan-Africanism

Pan-Africanism was initially an anti-slavery and anti-colonial movement amongst black people of Africa and the diaspora in the late 19th century. Pan-Africanism has covered calls for African unity (both as a continent and as a people), nationalism, independence, political and economic cooperation, and historical and cultural awareness (especially for Afrocentric versus Eurocentric interpretations).[4] **Pan-Africanism is the oldest vision in Africa. No other ideology has successfully challenged Pan-Africanism intellectually**. That is why, in the midst of confusion caused by the so-called **'African renaissance'**, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi echoed the pan-African call for **a United States of Africa** when he opened the fifth summit of the Organisation of African Unity in Libya in September 2009, during an AU meeting.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU)[5]

On May 25 1963 in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)[6], the 32 African states that had achieved independence at that time, agreed to establish the **Organization of African Unity** (OAU). A further 21 members joined gradually, reaching a total of 53 by the time of the AU's creation in 2002. On 9 July 2011, South Sudan became the 54th African Union (AU) member.

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[3] South-South cooperation is a broad framework for collaboration among countries of the South (BRICS) in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and technical domains and was organized and managed by developing countries themselves.

[4] Alistair Boddy Evans, What is Pan-Africanism? How Pan-Africanism Has Developed as a Modern Socio-Political Movement
http://africanhistory.about.com/od/politicalhistory/a/What-Is-Pan-Africanism.htm

[5] https://www.au.int/web/en/history/oau-and-au

[6] **Africa Day**, held annually on the 25 May is the annual commemoration of the 1963 founding of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), presently recognised as the African Union (AU). The commemoration is internationally renowned where, regardless of their location, Africans from all over the world celebrate the concept of African unison and revive their heritage.

The OAU's main objectives, as set out in the OAU Charter, were to promote the unity and solidarity of African states; coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States; rid the continent of colonisation and apartheid; promote international cooperation within the United Nations framework; and harmonise members' political, diplomatic, economic, educational, cultural, health, welfare, scientific, technical and defense policies.

The OAU operated on the basis of its Charter and **the 1991 Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (known as the Abuja Treaty)**. Its major organs were the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Council of Ministers and the General Secretariat as well as the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration; Economic and Social Commission; Educational, Scientific, Cultural and Health Commission; and Defense Commission. The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration was replaced by the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993.

African Economic Community (AEC)

Long before the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), African leaders had recognised that cooperation and integration among African countries in the economic, social and cultural fields were indispensable to the accelerated transformation and sustained development of the African continent. Since the early 1960s, member states were encouraged to combine **their economies into sub-regional markets that would ultimately form one Africa-wide economic union**. In 1980, the OAU Extraordinary Summit adopted the Lagos Plan of Action as a major step towards the goal of integration.

The commitments in this Plan and the Final Act of Lagos were translated into concrete form in Abuja, Nigeria in June 1991 when the OAU Heads of State and Government signed the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) [7] during the 27th Ordinary Session of the Assembly. Since May 1994, the OAU has been operating on the basis of the OAU Charter as well as the AEC Treaty (more popularly known **as the Abuja Treaty**) , and the organisation is now officially referred to as the OAU/AEC.

The aim of the AEC is to promote economic, social and cultural development as well as African economic integration in order to increase self-sufficiency and endogenous development and to create a framework for development, mobilisation of human resources

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[7] African Economic Community (1991, Abuja treaty), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/trtdocs/en/aec/trt_aec.pdf

and material. According to the treaty establishing the African Economic Community (1991, Abuja treaty), Article 6 (1) , the Community shall be established gradually in six (6) stages of variable duration over a transitional period not **exceeding thirty-four (34) years (i.e by 2028).** Specific activities shall be assigned and implemented concurrently, as the strengthening of existing **Regional Economic Communities (RECs)** and, within a period establishing economic communities in regions where they do not exist; coordination and harmonisation of tariff and non-tariff barriers among various RECs with a view to establishing **a Continental Customs Union**; the adoption **of a common policy** in several areas such as agriculture, transport and communications, industry, energy and scientific research;

The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) of the African Union

The Abuja Treaty has accorded special recognition to the critical role **of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)** in the stages of establishing the African Economic Community. Accordingly, a Protocol has been concluded on relations between **the AEC and RECs,** which should serve as an effective instrument and framework for close cooperation, programme harmonisation and coordination as well as integration among the RECs on the one hand, and between the AEC and RECs on the other.

Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs) include eight sub regional bodies which are the building blocks of the African Economic Community (AEC) established in the 1991 Abuja Treaty which provides the overarching framework for continental economic integration Africa's RECs do not only constitute key building blocks for economic integration in Africa, but are also key actors working in collaboration with the African Union (AU), in ensuring peace and stability in their regions.

The RECs are: 1) the **AMU -The Arab Maghreb Union**; 2) the **ECCAS -Economic Community of Central African State; 3) the COMESA -Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa**; 40 the **SADC -Southern African Development Community**; 5) the **ECOWAS -Economic Community of West African States**; 6) the **EAC- East African Community** ; 7) the **IGAD- Intergovernmental Authority Development**; 8) the **CENSAD-Community of Sahel-Saharan States**

The principal technical policy making organ of the **AEC is the Economic and Social Council, also known as ECOSOC.** The functions of ECOSOC are central to the implementation of the objectives of the AEC. As such ECOSOC is the most important

specialised organ in respect of all activities relating to, directly or indirectly, the intended establishment of the African Economic Community.

Transition to the African Union (AU)

Through the 1990s, leaders debated the need to amend the OAU's structures to reflect the challenges of a changing world. In 1999, the OAU Heads of State and Government issued the **Sirte Declaration**[8] calling for the establishment of a new **African Union**. The transformation of the OAU into the AU was prompted by this desire to accelerate the process of integration. African regional integration has its ideological roots in **Pan-Africanism**, which aims for the unity of African states and African people on the continent and in the diaspora. In terms of the institutional development, the formation of the AU in 2003 has been positively viewed as a big step forward for a deeper integration among its member states.

In total, four summits were held in the lead up to the official launching of the African Union, the Sirte Summit (1999), which adopted **the Sirte Declaration** calling for the establishment of the AU, the Lomé Summit (2000), which adopted the **AU Constitutive Act**, the Lusaka Summit (2001), which drew **the Road Map** for implementation of the AU and the Durban Summit (2002), which launched the AU and convened its first **Assembly of Heads of State and Government**.

A significant number of OAU structures were carried forward into the AU. Similarly, many of the OAU's core commitments, decisions and strategy frameworks continue to frame AU policies. However, while the footprint of the OAU is still strong, **the AU Constitutive Act and protocols established a significant number of new structures, both at the level of major organs and through a range of new technical and subsidiary committees**. Many of these **have evolved since 2002** and some are still under development.

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[8] Sirte Declaration,EAHG/Draft/Decl. (IV) Rev.1, http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/sirte.pdf

THE INSTITUTIONS OF AU

Constitutive Act of African Union[9]

The AU's Constitutive defined the conception of governance and underlies the **African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance** (the '**Addis Charter'**), which in turn provides the legal foundation for **the African Governance Architecture (AGA)**. The 'Addis Charter' articulates a comprehensive notion of governance that includes both human security and the objectives of the **UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)**[10] and the **New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)**[11]. The Constitutive Act of the AU incorporates various components of governance in its conceptualisation, strongly linking these to what it has termed **'African Shared Values'.**[12] These emphasise principles of democratic governance, democratic culture, popular participation, the rule of law, human and peoples' rights, justice, and balanced and sustainable socio-economic development (AU, 2000: art. 3-4).[13]

The Organs of the AU:

The AU organ , are: **the Assembly** where the Assembly of Heads of State and Government is the supreme organ of the Union; **the Executive Council**: Composed of Ministers or Authorities designated by the Governments of Members States and is responsible to the Assembly; **the Commission** :Composed of the Chairperson, the Deputy Chairperson, eight Commissioners and Staff members and each Commissioner shall be responsible for a portfolio ; **the Permanent Representatives Committee**, composed of Permanent Representatives of Member States accredited to the Union and is in charged with the responsibility of preparing the work of the Executive Council; **Peace and Security Council (PSC**; the **Pan-African Parliament, an** organ to ensure the full participation of African peoples in governance, development and economic integration of the Continent. The protocol relating to the composition, powers, functions and organization of the Pan-African Parliament

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[9]http://www.achpr.org/instruments/au-constitutive-act/

[10]http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/

[11]http://www.nepad.org/

[12] The African Union (AU) declared 2012, the **Year African of Shared Values**, an initiative aimed at promoting dialogue among all the continent's citizens on individual and national commitment to common values such as equity, equality, solidarity, communalism, and reconciliation. http://www.sharedvalueafrica.com/

[13]http://www.ipu.org/idd-E/afr_charter.pdf

has been signed by Member States and is in the process of ratification.; the **ECOSOCC**, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, an advisory organ composed of different social and professional groups of the Member States of the Union; t**he Court of Justice;** the **Specialized Technical Committees**, meant to address sectoral issues and are at Ministerial Level, such as the Committee on Rural Economy and Agricultural Matters; The Committee on Monetary and Financial Affairs; The Committee on Trade, Customs and Immigration Matters; The Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Energy, Natural Resources and Environment; The Committee on Transport, Communications and Tourism; The Committee on Health, Labour and Social Affairs; and The Committee on Education, Culture and Human Resources; and the **AU Commission**, which is the key organ playing a central role in the day-to-day management of the African Union. Among others, it represents the Union and defends its interests; elaborates draft common positions of the Union; prepares strategic plans and studies for the consideration of the Executive Council; elaborates, promotes, coordinates and harmonizes the programmes and policies of the Union with those of the RECs; ensures the mainstreaming of gender in all programmes and activities.

AU Financial institutions are the African Central bank; the African Monetary Fund and the African Investment Bank ies of the Union and **the official languages of the AU** and all its institutions are Arabic**, English, French, Portuguese, Spanish, Kiswahili and any other African language**. The **AU's working languages** are Arabic, English, French and Portuguese.

The African Governance Architecture (AGA):

The **African Governance Architecture (AGA**) and **African Governance Platform** were established in 2011 by the 16th ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa. Launched as an effort "towards greater unity and integration through shared values", the AGA is a **panAfrican[14]political, institutional, and collaborative framework for promotion of good governance on the African continent.** The AGA framework has so far been developed and led by the **AU Commission**. However, as implementation has accelerated, **several questions have arisen with respect to the roles of other actors in ensuring the AGA's successful operationalisation**

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[14]'P an-Africanism was initially an anti-slavery and anti-colonial movement amongst black people of Africa and the diaspora in the late 19th century. Its aims have evolved through the ensuing decades but today is seen much more as a cultural and social philosophy than the politically driven movement of the past,.', Alistair Boddy-Evans, *What is Pan-Africanism?*http://africanhistory.about.com/od/politicalhistory/a/What-Is-Pan-Africanism.htm

The main goal of the AGA was defined as to **connect, empower, and build the capacities of AU organ**s, **Regional Economic Communities (RECs)**, and **stakeholders, including civil society, to enhance good governance and democracy in Africa**.

The African Union Commission Strategic Plan 2014¬2017

The **African Union Commission (AUC) Strategic Plan 2014-¬2017** [15] constitutes the framework that outlines **the overall priorities of the Commission for the four year period**, and **provides guidance for program formulation and prioritization**. It provides space for AUC to play its facilitating role, especially, with respect to policy and strategy setting, coordination and catalyzing **Africa's socio-economic and integration agenda**, **consensus building and advocacy, experience and information sharing**. It seeks to establish the basis for creating the continental public goods and the enabling conditions necessary for peace, security, political stability and growth

African Vision 2063: 'The Africa we want' [16]

It is **a Strategic framework** for the socio-economic transformation of the continent over the next 50 years. It builds on and seeks to accelerate the implementation of past and existing continental initiatives for growth and sustainable development. Africans from all social formations and in the Diaspora have reaffirmed the AU Vision 2063 to build '**an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, an Africa driven and managed by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena as their overarching guide for the future of the continent**.'[17]

Some of the past and current initiatives it builds on include: the Lagos Plan of Action, The Abuja Treaty, The Minimum Integration Programme, the Programme for Infrastructural Development in Africa (PIDA), the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP), The New partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), Regional Plans and Programmes and National Plans. It is also built on national, regional, continental best practices in its formulation**.**

EU AS MENTOR FOR THE AU?

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[15]African Union Commission (AUC) Strategic Plan 2014-¬2017 https://www.au.int/web/en/auc/strategic-plan-2014-2017

[16] http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063.pdf

[17] Agenda 2063 'The Africa we want',
http://www.iri.edu.ar/publicaciones_iri/anuario/anuario_2015/Africa/30-NEPAD.pdf

We find, therefore, that the African continent is moving towards **the process of integration,** following the footsteps of the EU, adopting the organisational structure of mechanisms and institutions. The mechanism of **AU has a lot in common to its counterpart in the EU**, as we have seen above, e.g. the Constitute Act sets out nine (9) institutions (Assembly of Heads of State and Governments, the Executive Council, specialised Technical Committees, the Pan- African Parliament, the Court of Justice, the Commission, the Permanent Representative Committee and the Economic and Cultural Council) similar to EU institutions.

 The AU has also borrowed policy frameworks from the EU, such as the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), where the AU has its Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP), the Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the AU (ECOSOCC) as the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). Moreover, they have the African Governance Architecture (AGA), the Regional Economic Communities the African Union Commission (AUC), the Strategic Plan and the African Economic Community etc.

It is obvious that there are many quasi-identical institutional structures of the AU and the EU that are best described as **'institutional isomorphism'**[18]. But, as the African leaders said 'Africa should not reinvent the wheel' regarding regionalism[19]. But as we observe, **there are also differences in the African integration process**, such as, for instance, the issue of the creation of **the African Common Market**, which, at a first level, was created regionally.

So, the fact that the AU has been influenced by the EU, permit us to talk about the **Europeanisation of AU** or should we be talking about a **model for 'best practice'**?

There are a lot of definitions about **the term of Europeanisation** -*Ladrech (1994), Börzel (1999), Héritier (2001), Radaelli (2003), Ladrech (2010),etc -(for a recent review, see Olsen 2002)* but Featherstone's and Kazamias' definition for Europeanisation gives the dimension including other non-member states. They identify 3 key dimensions: - the increase and expansion of institutionalization at the EU level; - the relevant adjustment at the level of the member states; **other similar adjustments in non-member states** (Featherstone and Kazamias 2001b: 4)**. [20]**

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[18]J. DiMaggio & W. Powell, "The iron cage revisited" institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields", American Sociological Review, 48 (1983), 147-60.

[19]UeliStaeger, Africa-EU relations nd Normative Power Europe : Decolonial Pan-African Critique, Journal of Common Market studies, vol. 54, no 4, pp 992

[20]Stavridis St., (2003) The Europeanization of Greek foreign policy-A literature review, assessed at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/5692/1/Stavridis-10.pdf on 15.4.2012

The European Union has developed a foreign policy pillar which has been reaffirmed by the Lisbon Treaty, **with a specific institutional framework as a 'Global Actor'** and has contributed to the debate on the concept of Europeanisation, as a process, as a cause, and as an effect in the field of international relations.

To evaluate the adjustment of EU institutions to the AU, as a first step we have to examine if the AU assimilates the **Community method** [21] in its integration procedure. The formation of the AU has in part relied on the sharing and using norms and organisational templates from EU but the fact that AU had 'borrowed' the EU institutions doesn't mean that the regional process in the AU is similar to EU regionalisation.

Is is interesting to search the differences and the causes that provoke the differences as the two continent have different historical backgrounds and other perceptions in the creation of strong continent identity such as the African identity and the European identity. However, there are **critics to the European integration process**, who question the transfer of a model of regional integration that has many problems, **mainly a democratic deficit in its decision-making processes.** The criticism on that field is stressing that there is no attention given to the priorities **of local environment and to supporting local ownership.**

The decision –**making within the EU is a mix of supra-nationality and inter – governmentalism.** For the AU, regionalism is more than institutions, it is the procedure to reconciliate the colonial past, to harmonise all the different tribes, identities, cultures (the francophone, anglophone and lusophone) in Africa. It is the means to close the gap between African countries and the developed world. And never forget that the pan-African movement has left an unending imprint in the discussion of African regionalism.

Is this implementation of EU structures enough for a promising integration of the AU? Or does it become **machinery**, as Charles de Gaulle characterized the Organisation of United Nations (OUN) in 1960? Because as he said: '*The problem is that all these organisations have forgotten* **the people, who are the power and the engine of history**.*'*

So, maybe we could see the EU **as a mentor to Africa for the implementation of good practices**. Nevertheless, these weaknesses of the EU are an indication that the europeanisation tendency, as a model, is not a panacea for all regional unions. After all *how*

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[21] See appendix (3)

much of Europe is the rest of the world ready to accept? Where does Europe end? Is there a limit? Is there a point beyond which one can talk about over-Europeanisation?[22]

2nd SESSION: HOW EU IMPLEMETED 'GOOD' GOVERNANCE IN AFRICAN UNION: STRATEGY & TOOLS FOR THE DEMOCRATISATION OF AFRICAN STATES.

'GOOD' GOVERNANCE

Like many key concepts, '**governance**' is defined in different ways by different actors. No single definition is universally accepted, and the various crosscutting themes and associated challenges are also subject to a wide range of interpretations. Ultimately this has made it difficult to forge a common understanding of what has been perfunctorily labeled as 'good governance' or 'democratic governance'. Each actor has another perception for the conditionality of democratic governance.

The concept **of "good" governance** emerged from the circle of donor agencies/states between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s and has since become one of the most used terms in academic and policy debates[23]. Behind the new agenda of "good" governance, the World Bank was the driving force with a liberal perspective .

Adding adjectives such **as 'good', or 'bad' to governance** and specifying a desired outcome of governance process such as sustainable development, makes more explicit the normative aspect inherent to the concept's use[24]. But for many reasons "good" governance remains controversial. There was no one accepted definition, a fact that weakened the process of "good" governance itself. Moreover, the fact that it was used either as a self-fulfilling promise, or as a pre-requisite for development cooperation, created misgivings among the recipient countries. State-donors used different strategies to implement "good" governance on third countries, strategies that, in many cases, had strict conditionalities and sanctions on funding and external assistance, as opposed towards those countries that complied with the

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[22] Dimitrios V. Skiadas, "Europeanization of International Relations Governance: Much ado about nothing?" International Journal of Education and Social Science, vo; 1, no 1, 1 August 2014, pg 31

[23] Smith, B. (2007). Good Governance and Development, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

[24] Nikki Slocum-Bradley, Andrew Bradley, ' Is the EU's governance 'Good'? An assessment of the EU governance in its partnership with the ACP states, at EU Strategies on Governance Reform, Ed. Will Hout, Routledge, p 37 (ISBN 0415622034)

demands of the donors[25]. The **logic of the stick and carrot** could be said to be describing this relation between donor and recipient.

According to the general international law, a necessary pre-requisite for a state to participate in the international community is for it to cover the triptych: rule of law/human rights/democracy. Through this perspective, the process of financial assistance between states began, which aims at "good" governance and, by extension, to their "democratic" governance. Today, even though all states self-proclaim themselves to be democratic, more than 150 are not. [26]

For EU 'good' and democratic governance means rule of law, free elections, responsibility of the politicians, transparency, freedom of speech in all the public activities- social, economic and political.[27] The EU has come relatively recently to the debate on governance and development and "good" governance made its first appearance in an official EU document, where the Council and member states met within the Council on 28 November 1991 and declared the Resolution on Human Rights, Democracy and Development, where the EU would support efforts of developing countries to advance "good" governance. [28]

The EU's methodology on assessing governance, as reflected in the adopted '**governance profile'**, emphasises formal indicators of governance quality and pays insufficient attention to salient political or political-economic issues such as social; exclusion, inequality and state capture. After the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has developed a range of new policies and strategies to promote her approach to democracy and human rights, through external actions. [29]

EU- AFRICA RELATIONS : FROM COLONIALISM TO EQUALITY?

It is important to distinguish governance **as a purposive activity** from governance as **an explanatory tool** (the mechanism through which governance as a purposive activity

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[25] Carbone, M. (2012). The European Union, Good Governance and Aid Co-ordination, EU Strategies on Governance Reform, Between development and State-building ,Routledge, ISBN 0415622034(hbk)ed. By Will Hout, Routledge, pg 15-21

[26]Ρούκουνας, Ε. (2004) Διεθνές Δίκαιο, (τεύχος πρώτο), Σχέσεις διεθνούς δικαίου και εσωτερικού δικαίου. Τρόποι παραγωγής δικαίου, (3ηέκδ.), εκδ. Αντ.Σάκκουλα

[27]Strategy, p.9

[28] (Conference organized by International IDEA in collaboration with the Commission of European Communities and the ACP Secretariat, 23-25 November, Stockholm – Sweden).

[29] See appendix (1)

occurs)[30], as in this paper we will focus on governance as an explanatory tool. That means which are the tool EU use for the implementation of governance in AU and her member states

What are the tools and mechanisms that EU has used after the decolonization of Africa countries to implement 'good' and democratic governance in African states?

- **YAOUNDÉ I, II & LOMÉ I-IV:** In the early 1960s, some of the colonies became independent nations, but almost all were keen to keep all the benefits of their association with the EEC, which meant financial solidarity with their economic and social development and privileged access to the European market for their goods. So the Convention Association between the EEC and the **Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM**) was signed in **Yaoundéon 23 July 1963**, which produced a real European development policy with **18 AASM countries**, and then with the Lomé Conventions (I-IV)[31], the first of which was signed **with 46 States of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, the ACP Group of countries, in 1975.**

- **COTONOU PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (CPA) 2000-2020:** The **CPA is a binding Partner Agreement between the EU and the ACP** group signed on 23 June 2000 in Cotonou (Benin) and forms the continuation of the Treaties of Yaoundé I, II (1963) and Lomé I, II, III, IV (1975-1995) following the end of decolonisation, with the aim to maintain the special relationship that some EU (historically EEC/EC) member states had with their former colonies and overseas territories.

The focal point of the CPA is economic, social and cultural development and the reduction and gradual eradication of poverty in ACP states, through a sustainable development model combined with their progressive integration in the global economy. It still is the biggest **innovative international development agreement between the North and the South, involving a very big number of member-states (79 ACP states participate in the CPA and the total number of the EU states),** a binding conventional framework of intensive cooperation between the two sides, with a remarkable depth and scope, a content that includes three partnership pillars – **political, development and trade** – as well as pioneering founding principles, such as: (a) **equality and common obligations between the two parties**, (b) **"ownership"** of the development strategies by the ACP states and societies and (c)

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[30] Helen Yanacopulos, The rise of transnational coalitions of NGOs',p.247-266ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13600820500135379

[31] South Africa, was excluded from the Lomé Convention as the then EEC didn't recognise the status of developing economy after the apartheid.

establishment **of an institutional role not only by governments, but also by parliaments, local councils, the civil society and the private sector.**

THE AFRICA –EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP /JOINT STRATEGY

From April 2000, the two continents realised that there was a need to review their cooperation in order to integrate emerging challenges arising from globalisation. The new dialogue which started in Cairo in April 2000, a new template for relations between EU and Africa was appear as the European Commission published the EU **Strategy for Africa on the 10 October 2005**, and the Council of the EU endorsed the Strategy on 16 December 2005.

Importantly, the EU Strategy for Africa, emphasised a new approach to EU- Africa relations, based on ownership, equality and partnership. But did the EU- African Strategy achieved to built ownership and in what terms? The criticism about the EU- Africa Strategy was pointed at a total absence of real partnership with Africa, a lack of transparency and concepts of mutual accountability which are absolutely central elements of any real development for Africa. **There was little emphasis on the needs and aspirations of Africa and Africans**. This clearly indicates a lack of broader consultations with Africans in arriving at this Strategy.

  The EU clearly seeks to export its model of development, which reaffirms the traditional and unequal donor-recipient relation**. The concept of "ownership" is further eroded by European Commission proposals for transfer of development experience from the North African region and South Africa - all middle-income countries with very different paths of development to that of Sub-Saharan Africa.** If the EU wants to see more democratic and legitimate governments and policies in Africa, it **should recognise that civil society has a key role to play and needs more support.**

So, after the failure of the EU- Africa Strategy 2005, the European Commission introduce the Joint Africa- EU Strategy (JAES) **as Strategic Partnership** has become a key feature of current EU foreign relations. Being realistic about the failures of the past ,the Council of European Union in response to the demanding changes between Africa and the EU

cooperation, has rapidly developed new phase in the Africa-EU relationship, a new strategic partnership and **a Joint Africa-EU Strategy** as a political vision and roadmap for the future cooperation between the two continents in existing and new areas and arenas[32].

THE JOINT AFRICA –EU STRATEGY (JAES)

The JAES, which was adopted at the Lisbon Summit (2007), paved the way for long-term Strategic Partnership: **the first and only one the EU** has ever signed with another regional/multilateral entity and set a new framework of cooperation based on the principles of mutual respect, shared responsibility and pooling of efforts in the governance of world public assets and the reform of the UN system and **the Bretton Woods institutions.**

The innovation of the JAES is that it is the first EU framework which **aims to 'treat Africa as one',** as opposed to other frameworks that still regulate EU relations with African countries dividing between countries north and south of the Sahara, the CPA (2000-2020), the Barcelona Process, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (and now European Neighborhood Policy) with north African states (Maroco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt), as well as the Union of the Mediterranean (UM). The relations with South Africa does not fall under either framework, being instead regulated by the Trade, development, Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU in 1999 and the Strategic Partnership first agreed in 2006.

Principles based on the unity of Africa, the interdependence between Africa and Europe, **the partnership, the ownership** and the **equality**, the respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, as well as the right to development. In the light of this new partnership, EU is not only a donor of development aid but also a political and commercial partner. [33] In the case **of JAES, inter-regionalism** is presented **as a way to promote socio-economic development, human rights, political dialogue and mutual cooperation between the EU and Africa**, where **supranational institutional linkages are conducted through the European Parliament and the pan- African Parliament** and annual meetings of the Commissions, with the deployment of an EU delegation to the African Union in Addis Ababa.

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[32]THE AFRICA-EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP :A Joint Africa-EU Strategy, Council of the EU, Lisbon 9 December 2007
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf)

[33]Strategy, p.19

NEW POLITICAL INITIATIVES : The Governance Initiatives

-**African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM**) is one of the flagship programs of the African Union (AU). Three Regional Mechanisms(RMs) are developed: a) Eastern Africa Stand-by-Force Coordination Mechanism (**EASFCOM)** and b) **North Africa Regional Capability (NARC),c) Partnership for Africa's Developmen**t (**NEPAD**). NEPAD aims at fostering political and corporate governance in Africa . The governance initiative should be appreciated within the context of the EU's relations with the ACP countries as a whole. Article 9 (3) of the CPA provides that good governance underpins the relationship between ACP states and EU. It defines good governance as the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the purposes of equitable and sustainable development. Good governance has hitherto been considered as a stick with which the EU can exert leverage on ACP countries.

-**EU- Africa Human Rights Forum:** Its objective will be to encourage the sharing of resources and expertise on issues that relate to human rights**.** This Forum can be understood within the context of persistent human rights violations in certain African countries such as Darfur, The Democratic of Congo, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Somalia, Zimbabwe, etc.

African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is taking shape. African peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building mechanisms are being strengthened at the continental, regional and national levels. Continentally or regionally sponsored peace agreements are the norm on the continent today, and most African countries now enjoy peace and stability. The EU has been a key partner for African countries and organisations to help create conditions for lasting peace and stability. [34]

North African Governance Facility: It concerns the North African countries and envisages the establishment of a Governance Facility [35] regarding Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and the recent coup d'état in Mauritania and highlight the need for better governance in the region

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[34] THE AFRICA-EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP A Joint Africa-EU Strategy, Council of EU, Lisbon, 9 December 2007, 16344/07 (Presse 291)

Geographic Coherence: The Strategy announces a One Africa policy . The approach will aim at cherry-picking aspects of the CPA, the TDCA and the Barcelona Process which will shape its response to Africa as a single entity .

Migration: Is another area where EU proposes to adopt a proactive and forward-looking approach. Migration and Development' can be a positive force for development in both Africa and Europe and the Strategy outlines one of the way in which 'brain drain; could be turned into brain gain 'by helping African countries tap into the potential available in their diasporas in Europe and by facilitating various form of brain circulation, including return migration and temporary or virtual return by which African migrants can make their skills available to their home countries'. [36]

Conflict Prevention: The EU has been active in certain zones in Africa including the deployment of troops in the DRC in 2003 and spending over EUR92 million in Darfur.

2) ECONOMIC INITIATIVES:

-Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the Eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs): It is **important to stress that the division of Africa to Dark Africa and Arab Africa,** because of the differentiation that it presents in the way that it responds to its indigenous problems, emanating from the social and economic decline, was done on the basis of the modern institutional cooperation between the European and African states deriving from two distinct legal documents: 1) **the Barcelona Declaration (November 1995) and the Neighborhood Policy for North African countries** , which concerns the Arab Africa, 2) the **Cotonou Partnership Agreement**, which concerns **the Sub-Saharan Africa** and the **Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA)** with South Africa. Under this division**,** the economic arrangements between EU and specific African entities include: **1)** Economic Partnership Agreement between EU and Arab Maghreb Union **(AMU), 2)** Economic Community of Sahelo- Sharian States **(CEN-SAD)**, **3)** Inter-Governmental Authority for Development**(IGAD) 4)** Six (6) REcs with ACP[37] regional

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[36]The Strategy, at p. 34
(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0489&from=EN

[37] The CPA (articles 36-18) provides for the creation of EPAs between AC and ACP regions

groupings, **four** of which are in Sub-Saharan Africa(**SSA**):[38]**i**) the Economic Community of West African States (**ECOWAS** plus **Mauritania**),[39]**ii**) theCentral African Economic and Monetary Union plus Sào Tomé e Principe (**CEMAC plus STP**[40]), **iii**) the EPA forEast and Southern Africa (**ESA**)[41], **iv**) the Southern Africa Development Community Group(**SADC group**)[42]and,**mv**)the Caribbean (**CARIFORUM**)[43]and vi) Pacific (**PACIFIC**)[44].

-Euro-African Business Forum (EBF): to reinforce a closer cooperation between the private and the public sector. The EBF is presaged by the ACP Business Forum the objective of which is to regroup ACP private sector stakeholders so as to enhance the private- public dialogue at the national sub regional as well as ACP levels.

3)NEW SOCIAL BLUEPRINT

-Twinning Partnerships : Twinning of Schools and Cultural Institutions, Students Exchange Programs and Knowledge Transfer, Environmental Challenges, Social Dimendion to Globalization. The Commission is regarding how to involve also public entities such as local governments

-Product Diversification: Is the key element between EU- Africa relations as EU is Africa's main trading partner

It is critical to note that, with the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy, through successive Plans of Actions**, it has become clear that the European member states establish bilateral diplomacy with the African countries, which often distances itself from the Community policy of the European Union.** Thus, the lack of harmonization between bilateral policies and Community policy is likely to convey several, often contradictory, messages to Africa.

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[38] Sub Saharan Africa: see at the appendix

[39] West African States(ECOWAS plus Mauritania):Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo

[40] Central African Economic and Monetary Union plus Sào Tomé e Principe (CEMAC plus STP):Cameroon, The Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of Congo, Sào Tomé& Principe

[41] East and Southern Africa (ESA):Burundi, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe

[42] Southern Africa Development Community Group (SADC group): Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Tanzania, South Africa participates as an observer.

[43] Caribbean EPA (CARIFORUM): Antigua & Barbuda, The Commonwealth of the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, The Dominican Republic, Granada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts & Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad &Tobago.

[44] Pacific EPA (PACIFIC):Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.

THE EUROPEAN EXTERNAL INVESTMENT PLAN (EEIP) 2014 - 2020[45]

The European Commission in 14 September 2016 had proposed a new European External Investment Plan (EEIP) to encourage investment **in Africa and the EU Neighbourhood** to strengthen our partnerships and contribute to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. The EIP will be based on three pillars: the **1st Pillar:** a new investment fund, the **European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD),** which blending activities with a new guarantee to address and unblock bottlenecks to private investment. The EFSD will include two Regional Investment Platforms (**Africa and EU Neighbourhood).** They will combine existing blending instruments and will operate as a one-stop-shop to receive proposals from financial institutions and other public and private investors; the **2nd Pillar**: **technical assistance** for broader policy environment to help local authorities and companies develop a higher number of sustainable projects and attract investors, in order to further engage the private sector. The instruments available under the EFSD will be accessible to all investors through the provision of integrated services, offered by one-stop-shop; and the **3rd Pillar**: **a range of dedicated thematic, national and regional EU development** cooperation programmes, combined with structured political dialogue targeted at improving the investment climate and the overall policy environment in the countries concerned.

In addition, the European Investment Bank (EIB)'s lending operations form an integral part of the EIP. For this purpose, the Commission will expand the EU budget guarantee under **the EIB External Lending Mandate by a total of EUR 5.3 billion.** This includes a EUR 3.7 billion EU guarantee in support of the EIB Resilience Initiative in the Southern Neighbourhood and Western Balkans, which aims to mobilise additional financing in support of sustainable growth, vital infrastructure and social cohesion in Southern Neighbourhood and Western Balkan countries.

THE COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPER (CSP)

The main tool in the relationship between the European Commission and partner developing countries is the **Country Strategy Paper (CSP)**.. According to the European Commission, the establishment of a common framework for the formulation of CSPs makes "a significant contribution to achieving the goal of multiannual programming and to increasing the effectiveness and quality of the EU's external aid".

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[45] http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/state-union-2016-european-external-investment-plan_en

The European Commission responded to the Council's proposal signed CSPs with six fragile states [46] of Africa (Burundi, Cuinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste and Yemen.[47] The amount of EUR 684 million was disposed in the framework of the CSPs and it is interesting to see the analysis of these papers. The CSPs focus on the reconstruction of state capacities by technical and managerial means that overlook more fundamental political – economic problems in the countries concerned.[48] The Country Strategy Paper (CSP) shares the same fundamental logic as the regional operational programmes of the National Strategic Reference framework NSRS in the framework of the EU Cohesion Policy.

FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS

Africa needs money to finance the multitude of infrastructure projects, attain the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and succeed in the economic and political integration. After **more than half a century of cooperation with Europe**, Africa appears to be a continent that has stalled in its quest for progress and development.

EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND (EDF)

The EU, as a majors international actor in development cooperation, has the European Development Fund (EDF), its largest geographic instrument in this policy area, with **EUR30.5 billion** allocated to the 11th EDF for 2014-2020. First **established in 1958** and launched the following year (1959) the EDF has a geographic focus on number of overseas territories and third countries such as former colonies, with special ties with some member states. The nature of **EDF it's intergornenmental** and remains out the EU budget despite the fact that the European Commission, decides on their disposal, in cooperation with the countries that receive this support, and presents its decisions for final approval to the EDF Committee, which is formed by representatives from member states, with no fundamental jurisdiction. Ii is important to mention that the European Parliament (EP) has repeatedly call for the full integration of the EDF into the EU budget (so-called budgetisation) but the Commission didn't renew this call considering the expiry of Cotonou Agreement in 2020. [49]

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[46]See notes/ appendix
[47]Council of the European Union, An EU response to Situations of Fragility, p.2
[48]Hout, W. (2012). Governance and Development: changing EU policies, EU STRATEGIES ONGOVERNANCE REFORM: Between development and State-building, Routledge, ISBN 0415622034(hbk), p.1-12
[49]European Development Fund, EPRS, November 2014-PE542.140

Compare to other international donors, EU member states jointly provide more aid to Africa. In average terms Africa receives 41 per cent of the EU's total budget aid, 26 per cent of USA's and 13 per cent of Japan's. [50]

The paradox here is that Europe has a plethora of financial instruments (bilateral and Community) to support the African countries, but the problem lies in the access of these funds which is extremely difficult. From the part of Europeans, this constraint of access to European funds is explained by **the low capacity of African countries** and on the other side **by the complexity of the access procedures and justification of the use of the funds.**

The financial support provided to African countries via the JAES was based on the false premise **that reform can be bought**, as reflected **by the European Governance Initiative.** Very few political decisions have been adopted and implemented under the strategy mainly characterized by African' s actors in term of its inertia while there was no financial instrument to support the implementation of the JAES. The techno-bureaucratic dimension has dominated the policy perspective and there has been a lack of real political traction because of serious divergences on trade, international justice, governance and cultural goods. [51]

Furthermore, Africa still has three different agreements with the EU, thus dividing it into geographical areas as we have see before, where the Sub-Saharan area has financial instruments arising from the CPA, the Neighborhood Policy for the countries of North Africa , as well as thematic dialogue around specific issues such as security and development in the Sahel- making it difficult to enforce a new approach going beyond traditional development cooperation tools.

The EU development policies toward Africa, the EU is not at all a coherent development actor, rather, **the European Commission is often acting as just another donor or as the 29th member state**, where the fact to built her own identity as a global actor competes with the interests and identities of many member states. Since development policy usually involves the redistribution of significant amounts of money, it is not surprising that **EU member states continue to jealously guard their national prerogatives in this area**. [52]So, it is more than

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[50]F. Granell, ' The European Union and the New Partnership for Africa Development', (September- October 2002), 194 ACP-EU Courier, p.28

[51]Hout, W. (2012).*Governance and Development: changing EU policies*, EU STRATEGIES ON GOVERNANCE REFORM: Between development and State-building,139-154, Routledge, ISBN 0415622034

[52]Carbone, M. (2007) *The European Union and International Development: The Politics of Foreign Aid* (London: Routledge).

obvious, that European governance in its entirety is missing in the external relations; or rather it appears "à la carte".[53]

OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA)

The European Union and its Member States have kept their place as the world's largest aid donor in 2014. This is demonstrated by data published today by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD).[54] In June 2005 the European Council made such an ambitious commitment. The EU agreed new targets for Official Development Assistance(ODA) and committed itself collectively to increase (ODA) **to 0.56% of GNI by 2010 and 0.7% by 2015**. Compared to what is expected in 2006, this commitment should result in an estimated additional €20 billion per year in ODA by 2010 and an additional €46 billion per year by 2015. The EU also agreed to allocate at least 50% of this agreed increase to Africa. If implemented correctly, this will mean that by 2015 the EU collectively will be disbursing an additional €23 billion a year in Africa. Finally, the EU also called upon other donors and non-OECD countries to join this global effort. It is now time to put these commitments into practice and the Commission should closely monitor their implementation.

AU's PERCEPTION FOR THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS FROM EU

AU is dedicating a lot of effort to put **a new pan-African Governance Architecture** (AGA) in place and is developing its public and private institutional capacity at all levels – national, regional and continental. One central element of the process **of governance reform** is the establishment and strengthening **of credible national institutions**, whether at central level – such **as parliaments, the police and judiciary system or public financial management systems – or at local and regional level.** However, governance is **not only about institutions**, but also **about appropriate policies and adequate legal and regulatory frameworks.**

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[53] Carbone, M. (2012). The European Union, Good Governance and Aid Co-ordination, EU *Strategies on Governance Reform, Between development and State-building* By Will Hout, Routledge,
[54] http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4747_en.htm

In this context, the EU is committed **to supporting institutional development, knowledge-sharing and capacity-building.** EU support, based on dialogue and incentives, will build on the approach followed **to integrate governance in the EDF programming, under the Governance Initiative**, under which additional funding is provided to partner countries committed to engaging in reforms. EU support provided will apply the principle of African and local ownership and should follow African agendas.

CONCLUSIONS: What has Africa achieved

It is true that Europe has great expectations from the African countries, but Europe must realise that there are many Africas. Different political regimes, historical experience, cultural and religious contexts, economic dynamics and geographic characteristics, meaning that local communities, countries and regions often differ considerably from one another.

Over the last fifty years, Africa has developed a number of responses to the exigencies of the times. Two major transitions stand out in this regard:

-**The first transition** came a decade after several African countries gained independence (1960s and 1970s). In order to advance the agenda for economic emancipation and drawing lessons from the energy crisis of the 1970s, **Africa took the strategic decision to pursue continental integration as a strategy for economic development.**

-**The second transition** occurred in the decade of the 1990s after the end of cold war and the adoption by the OAU of the Declaration of the Fundamental Changes in the World and Africa's Response. **to foster democracy and good governance as well as economic development through deepening integration of the continent**.

After two dead decades of development (80's and 90's) Africa and the potential for increased marginalization, the continent turned the corner, with a better organized AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs); the consolidation of democracy and good governance including the introduction of the African Peer Review Mechanism; improved gender equality, and through the promotion of human rights and the rule of law. But is it enough? Are both sides satisfied with their cooperation?

Has Africa achieved its goals? Has the democratisation process of the African countries flourished?

To give an answer from the African side, I will use the world of Dr. Rene N' Guettia Kouassi (Bulletin 2014), the Director of the Economic Affairs of the African Union Commission, saying that ….. '*the development must **be considered** a pre-requisite, indeed a condition sine qua non to pacify Africa by establishing permanently and irreversibly **the Greek democracy** [55]in all its fullness. For we cannot emphasize enough that **where there is development, there is peace and the rule of law.** [56]*

Closing this paper, I wonder if the democratisation process is after all an internal procedure, where local actors must work for it, seeking a model that best befits their own historical and cultural values and not the transfer and the implementation of values and practices which are not in the culture and the history of these countries. The failure of African countries to establish democracy is based mostly at the absence of the society, as democratisation is a bottom up procedure.

Maybe the EU and the AU must reconsider the very conceptual basis of democracy, how this is perceived in their culture, how they build their cooperation on this foundation and the tools they choose to use.

I would like to end with an excerpt from Pericles' "Epitaph":

37. Ἀχρώμεθα γὰρ πολιτείαοὐζηλούση. Γιατί το πολίτευμα που έχουμε δεν αντιγράφειτοὺς τῶν πέλας νόμους, παράδειγμα δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ ὄντες τισὶν ἢ μιμούμενοι ἑτέρους.καὶ ὄνομα μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ὀλίγους ἀλλ' ἐς πλείονας οἰκεῖν δημοκρατία κέκληται·' (Θουκυδίδης , Περικλέους Ἐπιτάφιος. (We have a regime that does not copy laws of others. We are rather the model for others than their imitators. And this regime is named 'DEMOCRACY' because it is not the few that govern, but the majority." (Thucydides, Pericleous Epitaph))ιος)

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[55] The word "democracy (δημοκρατία) combines the elements dêmos (δῆμος, which means "people", "neighbourhood", "district") and krátos (κράτος, which means "force" or "power").

[56]Kouassi Rene N'Guettia, Africa- Europe Cooperation: Why a paradigm shift? In the Bulletin 2014, Africa- EU relations, by ecdpm, ISSN 2309-1827*, African Union COMMISSION*, June 2014

NOTES

1. **The EU new policies and strategies to promote democracy and human rights, through external actions**: i) the EU Communication on 'Empowering Local Authorities in partner countries for enhanced governance and more effective development outcomes' (EC, 2013), ii) the EU Communication on 'The roots of democracy and sustainable development Europe's engagement with civil society in external action" (EC, 2012), iii) the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on

Human Rights and Democracy (EC, Luxemburg, 2012), iv) the EU Communication on "EU support for sustainable change in transition societies" (EC, 2012), v) the Council conclusions by the HR/VP and European Commission on "A New Response to a Changing Neighborhood" (EC, 2012), vi) the EU Communication on " Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change" (EC, 2011), vii) the EU Communication on "Human rights and democracy at the heart of EU external action - towards a more effective approach" (EC & HR, 2011) and viii) a New Response to a Changing Neighborhood: A review of European Neighborhood Policy" (EC. 2011).

2. **Fragile states**: There are a lot of definitions for the fragile states but as observed by the World Bank the term fragile state reflects countries in risk with difficulties in partnerships, failing states, fragile environments and low income. But after the adoption of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in March 2005, the definitions can be grouped in three types**:** a) **State functions**: where the states have a lack of capacity or will to perform certain functions that contribute to the security an dtheweel being of a country's citizens; b) **State outputs**: where the states host a lot of problems, including poverty, violent conflict, terrorism, global security threats, refugees, organized crime, epidemic diseases and environmental degradation; such problems may cause difficulties in neighboring countries or across a whole region and, c) **Relationship with donors**: this definition understand the difficult relationship of this states with particular donor or group of donors. It implies that fragility it seen to result from factors that have more to do with relationship that with the nature of the state itself. (*Hout, W. (2012). Governance and Development: changing EU policies, EU STRATEGIES ON GOVERNANCE REFORM: Between development and State-building,Routledge, pp 141, ISBN 0415622034*

3. **Community method**: The community method it is explained well in the contribution that the representatives of the European Commission (Commissioners Barnier and Vitorino) submitted to the European Convention in April 2002: 'The 'pure' community method corresponds to a system in which the Commission - the institution representing the general European interest - holds the monopoly of legislative initiative (namely the ability to propose laws) while the Council - an institution made up of representatives from the governments of the member states - and the European Parliament - an institution representing European citizens - adopt European laws by co-decision. In addition, the Council generally votes by qualified

majority, with unanimity being needed to amend the Commission's proposal. By contrast, the intergovernmental method aims at a decision-making process in which member states negotiate a common position on different files among themselves and as sovereign powers without any obligation to be coherent or transparent. In addition, states take decisions by unanimity and without the European Parliament being involved, which generally leads to a search for the lowest common denominator between the member states' respective positions."

4. MEMBER STATES OF THE AU[57]

People`s Democratic Republic of Algeria
Republic of Angola
Republic of Benin
Republic of Botswana
Burkina Faso
Republic of Burundi
Republic of Cameroon
Republic of Cabo Verde
 Central African Republic
The Republic of Chad,
Union of the Comoros
Republic of the Congo
Republic of Cote d'Ivoire
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Republic of Djibouti
Arab Republic of Egypt
RepublicofEquatorialGuinea

StateofEritrea
FederalDemocraticRepublicofEthiopia

GaboneseRepublic

RepublicoftheGambia
RepublicofGhana
RepublicofGuinea
RepublicofGuinea-Bissau

RepublicofKenya

KingdomofLesotho

RepublicofLiberia
Libya
RepublicofMadagascar

RepublicofMalawi

RepublicofMali
RepublicofMauritania
RepublicofMauritius
RepublicofMozambique

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[57] https://www.au.int/web/en/countryprofiles

[RepublicofNamibia](#)
[RepublicofNiger](#)
[FederalRepublicofNigeria](#)
[RepublicofRwanda](#)
[SaharawiArabDemocraticRepublic](#)
[Democratic Republic of sao Tome and Principe](#)
[RepublicofSenegal](#)
[RepublicofSeychelles](#)
[RepublicofSierraLeone](#)
[SomaliRepublic](#)
[RepublicofSouthAfrica](#)
[RepublicofSouthSudan](#)
[RepublicofTheSudan](#)
[KingdomofSwaziland](#)
[UnitedRepublicofTanzania](#)
[TogoleseRepublic](#)
[TunisianRepublic](#)
[RepublicofUganda](#)
[RepublicofZambia](#)
[RepublicofZimbabwe](#)

5. LIST OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES:
https://www.loc.gov/rr/amed/guide/afr-countrylist.html

Angola	Côte d'Ivoire	Madagascar	Seychelles
Benin	Djibouti	Malawi	Sierra
Botswana	Equatorial Guinea	Mali	Leone
BurkinaFaso	Eritrea	Mauritania	Somalia
Burundi	Ethiopia	Mauritius	South
Cameroon	Gabon	Mozambique	Africa
CapeVerde	The Gambia	Namibia	Sudan
CentralAfricanRepublic	Ghana	Niger	Swaziland
Chad	Guinea	Nigeria	Tanzania
Comoros	Guinea-Bissau	Réunion	Togo
Congo (Brazzaville)	Kenya	Rwanda	Uganda
Congo (Democratic Republic)	Lesotho	SaoTome and Principe	Western Sahara
	Liberia	Senegal	Zambia
			Zimbabwe

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